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that nobody spoils your faith through
intellectualism."
I t seems to me, however, that Colossians 2:8 is not a warnina against the
pursuit of scholarship or of theoretic distinctions and explanations.
Rather, it
showsthat the antithesis runs through all of
life. The antithesi$ is announced as early as
Genesis 3: 15 and is repeated through all of
the Bible. If we are to pursue our scholarship biblically, we cannot do so by failing
to take account of the distinctions which
the antithesis demands.

Putting the title of this discussionin
question form allows it to reflect rightly
the attitude of many Christian scholars.
Because
they aredoing so manyof the same
things that the non-Christian scholar is
doing, they are forced to askwhethertheir
scholarshipas Christiansmust begin with a
confessionalstance.This questionhasbeen
a problem for Christianscholarsever since
they came into contac~with Greek pagan
thought. It continuesto be a problem for
many evangelicalChristians today, who,
either asprofessionalscholarsor as laymen,
are trying to attain consistencyand integration in their intellectual life.
Today, as in the past,sometry to dispose of the problem by dismissingthose
conclusionsof theoretic thought which do
not directly agree with the Bible as they
interpret it. To aggravatethe conflict between Jerusalemand Athens, one can refer
to such texts from the Bible as Colossians
2:8, "Beware lest any man spoil you
through philosophy and vain deceit, after
the tradition of men,after the rudimentsof
the world and not after Christ." To make
sure that you cover all of scholarshipand
not just philosophy, you can call in the
Philips translation which reads,"Be careful

SomeChristianshaveevadedthe ArJ-Q~
by the use of compartmentalization.
On the one hand, they have the "givens" of
their faith. Those are not to be questioned
and so are left standing apart from their
professional pursuits as scholars. Tertullian
said he believed becauseit was absurd to do
so. It defied all logic as well as the demands
of scientific verification. So Barth also had
to deny miracle or the possibility of Christ
coming into history in a way that is
straightforwardly meaningful in the world
of sense experience. Because God, the
"wholly other," could not come directly
into time, Barth had to place the Incarnation in the non-scientific limbo of
"Geschichte" in order to avoid the radical
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construed to mean that I am calling into
question his love for our Lord and Savior,
Jesus Christ, or his dedication to the cause
of Christian scholarship.
The medieval monk thought he could
cloister himself away from the conflicts
inherent in the Christian's confrontation
with the antithesis. But even then, those
who were engaged in scholarship were confronted with and sometimes tantalized by
the existing pagan \Nritings. One can
imagine a monk taking in the metaphors of
Virgil with heady delight while the abbot
was out of sight, somewhat I ike a teenage
boy inhaling his first cigarette out of sight
of his parents.
Very early someone found a useful
figure to justify the appropriation of pagan
ideas, when they were considered usefuI
and did not seemto carry any thought that
stood in diametrical opposition to the plain
truth of the Bible as they interpreted it.
Th is figure was 'that of the Hebrews rei ieving the Egyptians of their treasure as the
Hebrews made their Exodus. This analogy
was already in use at the time of Augustine.
Rabanus Maurusof the ninth century court
school of Charlemagnerepeats the idea with
the added provision, "The philosophers,
especially the Platonists, if perchance they
have spoken the truth, are not to be
shunned but their truth appropriated as
from unjust possessors." Those who employed tllis figure failed to note that much
of the Egyptian treasure was later used to
form the golden calf that so stirred the
wrath of Jehovah as f\l1oses
cam down from
the mount with the Ten Commandments.
In the thirteenth century, Thomas
Aquinas, the noted Dominican theologian,
formulated an approach to Christian scholarship which under the name "Thomism"
hassince that time borne his stamp. Taking
his general method from Aristotle, Aquinas
began with the empirical-rational method,
which in the modern period has been
identified with scientific method. By the

consequencesof the antithesis.
Some Christians seem to feel that the
problem created by the antithesis can be
solved by a kind of division of labor in
scholarship. Christians in the past have
often busied themselves with theology and
"moral science" ashaving particular religious
significance, while the natural scienceswere
relegated to the non-Christian as a kind of
neutral area. In the natural sciences, the
antithesis had little force.
With that
emphasis in mind, it often happened in the
early history of American church-related
collegesthat the President taught the course
in "moral philosophy" to make sure that
the job was done right and, I presume, to
strengthen himself in the assurancethat he
was heading a Christian college.
Though I don't like the single-text
way of getting at the biblical perspective on
a subject, I would call attention to the fact
that it is also in Colossiansthat we are given
an impetus towards integrated learning.
I n Colossians 1: 17, where the personal
pronoun clearly refers to Christ, we read,
"And he is ,before all things, and in him
all things consist." I take it that "all" here
admits of no exceptions. It would follow
that if we are to understand any "thing,"
that we will have to begin by taking it in its
creational context. Furthermore, "thing" in
this context should not be limited to
tangible entities such as desk and chairs, but
must be extended in meaning to cover also
our doing and the very possibility of any
meaningful saying-or non-meaningful saying, for that matter, as the latter can only
be what it is in the context of the former.
I n the history of Christian thought,
those who felt the need for some meaningful association between their Christian confession and their intellectual pursuits have
from time to time approached the solutions
in divergent ways. Let me promptly and
sincerely say that if it turns out in sequel
that I differ radically with the position of a
fellow Christian. it should by no means be
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Thomistic method, all rational human beings
can share a common deposit of knowledge,
Christian and non-Christian alike, as long as
it comes by senseperception and is rationally organized. No distinction need be
maintained between Christian and nonChristian thought as it operates with a
common method and with common ingredients. What distinguishes the Christian is
the fact that through the_Bible he is given
the mysteries of the Christian faith which
are necessary for his salvation. The interpretation of the Bible, meanwhile, remains
the sole prerogative of the Church.
While Thomism had a necessaryplace
for the Bible as to the way of salvation, at
the same time it developed a "natural
theology" by which it offered proof for the
existence of God on the basisof the inductive procedures which had been developed
by Aristotle. Thomists argued from the
obvious appearance of motion to the need
of a Primer Mover. God, the omnipotent,
then becomes the best candidate for the
title of Prime Mover. So with a bit of inductive sleight of hand, they moved up
from the natural to the Creator of the
natural. Not all Roman Catholics were
content to follow the line of argument set
by Thomas Aquinas, however. In the early
seventeenth century, the French' philosopher-mathematician Blaise Pascal showed
up the inductive gap in the argument of the
Thomists. He insisted that by the method
of natural the.ology we cannot move to the
God of the Scriptures.
The God of
Aristotle is not the God of Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob.
Even before the time of Thomas
Aquinas, St. Anselm of Canterbury had
tried to give the Christian belief in God a
reasonable proof through his 9 prio[!- argument. He argued that the very concept of
God includes the concept of perfection, and
the concept of perfection includes the concept of existence; therefore, God necessarilyexists. Anslem's Qntological argum!!!2!:
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was buffeted about by subsequent philosophers with a variety of disproofs. Many
were satisfied that it was permanently laid
to rest by Kant when he suggestedthat the
argument is invalid becauseexistence is not
a predicate. But it would be like saying,
God. is good; God is powerful; and God is
"is." But Kant's argument did 'not terminate the discussion. Only a few years ago,
Alvin Plantinga, Professor of Philosophy at
Calvin College, edited a small-volume treatment of the subject, thoughf h~ did not try
to find new validity for Anse'lm's ~pproach.1
The difficulty Wittl the argument of
the Thomists, both medieval,ari'd modern,
and the argument of Anselm should now be
obvious. We cannot move by an unbroken
causal series of events in creation to the
Creator as First Cause. ..,lJVe
cannot move
by an unbroken chain of logical steps from
a presumably self-evident assumption in our
minds to the Creator of all minds. In each
case,we end up with an abstraction, instead'
of the God of our salvation who has
revealed Himself in the Bible as a personal,
triune God and has provided for our redemption in Christ.
Roman Catholics often point with
pride to the magnificent job that Thomas

Aquinas did when he built a Christian
superstructure on the foundations provided
by Aristotle. They see no need to begin
with our Christian confession as the only
possible foundation.
Some evangelicals 1
would borrow the Thomistic blueprint.
They assume that they must present trleil
casein such a way that it will seem plausible
to the non-Christian, using the - nonChristian's rule of plausibility.
John Warwick Montgomery writes,
"Dogmatics is a field of endeavor directed
to Christian believers and thus properly
begins with God's inerrant revelation of
himself in Holy Scriptures. But apologetics
is directed to ~belie~~-to
those who by
definition do not accpet God's Word as
divine utterance. Here the focus must be

on their needs, and the starting point has
to be the common rationality (the inductive and deductive procedures) which all
men share.,,2 In his little book, Christianity
and Philosophy, Artheur F. Holmes of
Wheaton College gives the same idea rather
explicit expression. Holmes writes concerning the Christian philosopher asan apologist,
"He will seek to show that Christianity is
intellectually respectable, that it is relevant,
that it is defensible, that it is the most
appealing of all the voices that clamor for
the ears of contemporary man.,,3
From the quotations just cited, one
would have to assume that there is a
widespread agreement as to what constitutes "common rationality," aswell as what
is "respectable" and "defensible" in the
world of non-Christian thought and among
"Scholarsgenerally. That may have been the
case when scholars were rather uniformly
under the spell of eighteenth-century rationalism. Today, however, that is by no
means the case. There is a great deal of
disagreement as to what logic ought to
control one's thinking.
There seemsto be a considerable body
of opinion among evangelical scholars that
the "law of non-contradiction" is the paradigm for plausibility. For Montgomery, it
would seemthat asking the non-Christian to
set asidehis dogmas for yours would be like
asking the Las Vegas gambler to throw
down his money at the gaming table, all the
while knowing that the croupier has the
stakes contrived against him. The nonChristian ought to be given a sporting
chance. He should not be asked to knuckle
under to the "foolishness of preaching" at
the outset, and to take the beliefs acquired
in that way as the controls for his philosophy or whatever other kind of theorizing
might be his scholarly pursuit.
In the past one hundred years within

the Reformed community, Abraham Kuyper was one who felt that confessional
demandswere of the essenceof scholarship.
He felt this so strongly that with his
positions of influence he was able to gain
support for the establishment of the Free
University of Amsterdam. Yet, as a man of
his time along with Princeton theologians of
the same day, Kuyper did not work out his
confession with the kind of thoroughness in
his theory of knowledge that one might
have expected on the basis of his arguments
for the need of a confession,ally based
university. I n his own writings, remnants
of Platonism and Scholasticism remained
here and there to haunt the halls of his new
educational establishment.4
Herman Dooyeweerd, for almost forty
years a professor at the Free University and
now emeritated, spent a lifetime working
out a systematic philosophy along the line
of Kuyper's beginnings. Dooyeweerd identified three Qroundmotives whiGh have controlled the thinking of Western man
throughout the centuries ever since the
beginning of scholarship with the ancient
Greeks. Dooyeweerd would not have us
think of these Qroundmotives as directional
motifs with limited results. They determined the entire pattern of cultural development and the spirit of Western thought.5
Taking as his Qroundmotive the scriptural
theme of creation, fall, and redemption,
Dooyeweerd engaged in a penetrating and
relentless critique of all thought that did
not begin with that scripturally-based motif
as its starting point.
Dooyeweerd's criticisms were hailed
by many as the catharsis which would purge
Reformed philosophizing of the last remnants of Platonism and Scholasticism, that
is, philosophizing which began with some
immanent principle, inst~ad of using the
Creator as the transcendent source of all
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meaning.
However, when Dooyeweerd
began the constructive part of his philosophizing, disappointment was expressed by
some of his early admirers. Cornelius Van
Til, whose tenure as Professor of Ethics and
Apologetics at Westminster Thelogical Seminary was concurrent with that of Dooyeweerd at the Free University, expressed
disagreement with Dooyeweerd's transce!Jdental critiQue. Van Til pointed out that in
his immanent critique of philosophic
thought Dooyeweerd begins immanentistically ~ithout the assumption that no meaningful prediction can take place outside of
the parameters of the Scriptural q[Qundmotives which Dooyeweerd himself had ac~d
on the basisof his Christian faith.6
Through all the years that he occupied
the chair of Apologetics at VVestminster,
Cornelius Van Til has insisted that there

areno~

"The natural man uses his logical powers
to describe the facts of creation as though
these facts existed apart from God. He has
rejected the common mandate. (Cf. Gen.
1: 28) It is therefore in conjunction with
the sinner's subjective alienation from God,
as a limiting concept merely, that we can
speak of anything as not having been destroyed by sin. In the interpretive endeavor
the 'objective situation' can never be abstracted from the 'subjective situation'."]
Van Til's position has not been widely accepted among Evangelicalsgenerally. Scholars in the Reformed community have also
shown reluctance becausethe preconditions
seem too stringent by way of an appraoch
to the presumption that there is commonly
sharable body of knowledge available alike
to Christian and non-Christian scholars.
As he is a leader in the Christian Re-'
formed community of scholars, we can also
profitably follow the work of Dr. Nicholas
Wolterstorff of Calvin College as it relates
to confessional scholarship. In 1955 as a
college student, Wolterstorff asserted that
in order to be Christian, a philosophy would
have to be directly deducible from statements found in the Bible. As this is
obviously impossible, Christian philosophy
is an impossibility.8 Presumably, this can
be applied to the other sciencesas well.
Some years later as Associate Professor
of Philosophy at Calvin College,Wolterstortf
contributed an article for a "Festschrift"
wh ich acknowledged the emeritation of W.
Harry Jellema, as the nestor of the philosophy department at Calvin College. In the
lead article of that volume of essays,Wolterstorff treated the subject "F.aith and
Philosophy." He wrote, "In principle, at
least, it seemspossible for a man's philosophical perspectivesand his way of life to be
independent-for his philosophical appeal
to be independent of his ultimate trust."9

facts. Everypossiblestatement

stands in the context of pre:.interpretation.
I n a 1937 add ressbefore the convention of
the National Union of Christian Schools,
Cornelius Van Til challenged the teachers
to take that view of "fact" into their classroom. This view immediately created problems for Christian scholars. How do you
account for the situation that non-Christians can count, write, and contribute many
wonderful discoveries in the field of science? And if all facts are contextual, how
do you set them into the context of your
biblically grounded faith? It soon became
apparent that the exposition of "Common
Grace" which came out of the 1924 Synod
of the Christian Reformed Church was of
little help to the Christian scholar in taking
account of the problem of communicating
!9- and working ~
the non-Christian
scholar.
Cornelius Van Til continued to maintain, however, that the non-Christian uses
his gifts of scholarship in an apostate way.
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Aside from the fact that the designation
"ultimate trust" comes across as a kind of
Tillichian substitute for Jehovah, I would
have to argue that Wolterstorff, in this
instance~ has his order exactly reversed.
For while in practice we often do keep our
philosophizing or our scholarship and our
confession separate, in principle they never
can or should be separated.
I n his most recent book, On Universals,
with analytic and linguistic finesse,Wolterstorff treats the history and tile implications
of the concept of Universals as it has
affected various theories of knowledge
throughout the development of philosophy
ever since ancient times. Wolterstorff concludes that one can posit tliree kinGs of
entities: Creator, creatures,and predicables.
This may come as somewhat of as a surprise
to those who have been accustomed to a
dual distinction, namely, Creator and creature.
How does Wolterstorff argue his case?
After some discussion concerning God's
properties and whether or not He is a
necessary being, Wolterstorff concludes as
follows: "Further, if God did not exist,
then the proposition 'God exists' would be
false. And then the proper.ty of being
either true or false would still be exemplified. It would still exist. This existence of
this property seems not to depend on God
even in the sensethat if God did not exist
it would still exist.10 Once more I must
demur. I would have to say that as a precondition, pne's confession would rule out
the possibility that any entity can exist on
the basis of syntactical or semantic necessity. No predicable can stand outside of the
creating Word of God, as God is the basis
for g!l meaning.
This past September we welcomed
Professor Wolterstorff to the Dordt campus
as the first lecturer under the sponsorship

of a newly formed consortium of Reformed
and Presbyterian colleges. I n his lectures,
Wolterstorff was concerned with the development of a Christian "theory of theories."
This bears directly on the subject of
Christian scholarship, so we had the opportunity to bring ourselves up to date on
Wolterstorffs thinking. Before proceeding
to an examination of his thought, it is
necessaryto issuetwo cautions. Fir~t, while
the ~
discussionwas written "before
Wolterstorff arrived at Dordt and has bibliographical references, the subsequent discussion is based on an introductory unscripted lecture and on further lectures
which as yet are available only in mimeograph copy with a very limited distribution
up to this time. Second, though I am sure
that Wolterstorff spoke from a basic position that is part of his mature thought, the
purpose of the lectures was to be somewhat
of a catylist to get the above-mentioned
consortium moving in the direction of some
new endeavors on the subject of Christian
scholarship.
I n his first lecture, Wolterstorff asserted that he wanted to be a Kuyperian
"transformationalist."
He would avoid the
twin hazards of pietism and dogmatism in
in favor of relevant change in the world.
This is not to conclude that there is no
place for dogma or that one must eschew
piety.
Getting into the material of his mimeographed copy in the second lecture, Wolterstorff concentrated on past attempts to
develop a theory of theories, in particular,
the past attempts at tying theory to the
demands of one's Christian confession. All
previous attempts were set aside as coming
under the indefensible rubric of "Foundationalism." In reporting the~lectures, tile
Dordt Diamond ran the heading "Foundationalism Blasted." Perhaps one should
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pass that off as a bit of student hyperbole
or student eagernessto see certain "sacred
cows" led off to the abattoir.
In any case, in his captivating way,
Wolterstorff disqualified Thomism for its
empirical-rational attempt to tie theory to
its foundations. Some evangelicals came
under criticism for trying to use their
"control beliefs"-beliefs which are part of
their foundation-as data for their theories.
For example, a dispensationalist might use
his control beliefs as data for a theory of
history. Wolterstorffalso rejected Cornelius
Van Til's insistence that one's confessional
base precedes an theorizing and unifies it
while at the same time tying the subjective
firmly to the objective. For Wolterstorff,
the monistic direction of Van Til's approach too closely parallels Idealism.
Though for the most part, we applauded Wolterstorff's declared intention
once more to move Christian scholarship
along the lines of Kuyperian transformationalism, I think his theology reflects the
interim influence of tile historical-critical
met:'od and that of Neo.-orthodoxy. The
historical-critical approach is apparent in
Wolterstorff's reflection on the Scriptures;
for he says, in reference to the Old and New
Testament, "These are, on the one hand,
expressions of tile religion of ancient persons and peoples. But they have always
been judged, by the community of Christfollowers at large, as proper guides for our
thoughts and our lives,"1"! The first sentence
would be entirely unacceptable to Abraham
Kuyper, as well as to such later theologians
in the Reformed tradition as the Kuipers,
R. B., H.J., and Herman, as well as to Louis
Berkhof and John Murray. They would all
begin with the self-authenticating character
of the BiiJle.
The Neo-orthodox aspect of Wolterstorff's thought, it seems to me, demon-

strates itself in his uneasinesswith the idea
that in the Reformed tradition God has
been deemed an atemporal being. The
question then arises, How can an atemporal
being be busy in the time-reckoned events
of man in history? The neo-orthodox
thinker cannot allow God as the "Wholly
Other" to break into the history of revelation without using a virtually non-historical
category, that of Geschichte. Basically, the
problem as to how one communicates
meaningfully concerning the revelation of
God in history is of a piece with the problem of how one ties his scholarship to his
confession. I s it not a fact that the Biule
places God outside of our time reckoning,
though it speaks anthropomorphically concerning God's participation in history? It
would seem, then, that the solution does
not lie in the direction of placing the God
of history

~

history as a way of allow-

ing Him to reveal himself progressively
tilrou~h history. If I have misconstrued tile
basis for Wolterstorff's difficulty at this
point, I assume that he will elucidate his
views on this subject in the future.
The exploratory character of Wolterstorff's lectures gave them a kind of
"nothing ventured, nothing gained" atmosphere. So I venture some critique of his
ideas on "a theory of theories." There is
some unresolved inconsistency in Wolterstorff's solution at this time. For example,
he says, "It is important to see that a
person's control beliefs determine his theoretical activity from the inside. They are
not simply added on.,,12 Consistent pursuit
of that idea, it seems to me, should lead
Wolterstorff in the direction of reconstructing Abraham Kuyper along the lines
of Cornelius Van Til and the early Herman
Dooyeweerd.
Wolterstorff reassertshis belief in the
integral nature of control beliefs when he
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tionism of Herman Dooyeweerd

states, "The scholar who is serious about
his Christian assent will be one whose'
a~sent works within his theorizing." 13
Having said that, Wolterstorff goes on to
say, "I wish to insist on the fact that
theories acceptable to Christians are acceptable to others as well. If someone'stheory
of theories affirms or entails the opposite, I
take that to be a decisive mark against it." '14

and the
presellt position of Cornelius Van Til too
limiting, there is the choice of going back
to Abraham Kuyper. By this time, I think
it should be obvious that our work towards
a Christian Theory of Theories will stand in
the setting of our unfinished business with
respect to common grace.

By way of further fostering the idea of
common knowledge between the Christian
and the non-Christian, Wolterstorff insisted
that both have a common expereince and
knowledge of color, as, for example, the
blueness of the upholstery on Dordt's
lecture-room chairs. I n contrast, I would
respond that though the Christian and the
non-Christian share God's creation as. a
common source of knowledge, the nonChristian has no basis for knowing that he
can know and therefore never does ~
ficantl~ know. He is at best hemmed in by
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probability.
I n his "blasting" of "Foundationalism," Wolterstorff suggestedthat we cannot tie our confession to bur theorizing
analytically, empirically, or by the use of
the a priori of Cornelius Van Til. At the
sametime, under the influence of positivism
and the language analysis schools of philosophy, Wolterstorff wou Id put us in fear of
resorting to the use of rhetoric or metaphor
as we refer to the foundations of our theorizing. At this point, at least, I don't
think that we have been furnished with a
creditable substitute for that which we
have been encouraged to abandon.
After we had terminated
our discus..
sions and Wolterstorff was winging his way
back home, it occurred to me that we had
done a lot of talking about a subject which
has at its base the problem of ~ommon
~
though the term was never mentioned. If we find the early Reconstruc-
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